OFF-FARM WORK DECISIONS OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES: JOINT DECISION MAKING Wallace E. Huffman and Mark D. Lange* Abstract-Theoretical and econometric models are developed to examine joint wage-labor participation and hours decisions of a husband and wife in farm households. The econometric model is multiple equation and recursive. The specification of the off-farm labor supply equation of the husband (wife) depends on whether his (her) wife (husband) does or does not work off-farm, and this structure is endogenous. The model is fitted to data for Iowa farm households. The main conclusion is that the off-farm labor supply equation of a married individual differs significantly depending on whether his or her spouse also works for a wage.
I. Introduction
TE ARLIER econometric studies of off-farm i2f labor supply decisions of U.S. farmers (Huffman, 1980; Sumner, 1982) failed to consider the implications of non-negativity constraints on off-farm hours. Each time that a binding nonnegativity constraint is encountered (e.g., the spouse does not work off-farm), the economic structure-some of the variables to be included and all the coefficients-of household decision functions are changed.
The objective of this paper is to propose and fit a recursive multiple equation econometric model of joint decisions for off-farm work of a husband and wife in farm households where endogenous switching of the econometric structure occurs whenever binding non-negativity constraints occur. The econometric model, which is adapted to take account of several serious problems that arise in implementing this procedure, is fitted to data for Iowa farm households. The main conclusion is that the off-farm labor-supply equations differ significantly depending on whether the spouse also works off-farm.
The paper has the following organization. Section II presents a model of time allocation where binding non-negativity constraints can occur. In section III, an econometric model of these decisions is described. Section IV presents the empirical results, and the final section presents a few implications.
II. A Model of Time Allocation
The labor-supply decisions of husbands and wives in farm households are derived from a behavioral model that permits self-employment on their farms and wage work off-farm. For similar models, see Huffman (1980) , Rosenzweig (1980) , Sumner (1982) , and Strauss (1986) . The decision unit is a single-family farm household, and to simplify the analysis, the time allocations of only the husband (M) and wife (F) are considered. The husband and wife work to obtain income for spending on consumption goods. The farm household is competitive in output and input markets and receives cash income from net farm income (PqQ -WX), other household income (V), and possibly, income from off-farm wage work (WMTg' + WFTF). Cash income is spent on consumption goods (Y):
where Pq is the price of farm output (Q), WX is the outlay on purchased farm inputs, and P, is the price of Y. The off-farm wage rate net of commuting cost is W' = W'(T), where T represents distance to off-farm jobs. More generally, commuting expenses to off-farm work depend on the amount (days) of off-farm work.
The off-farm labor-demand or wage-offer equations facing husbands and wives are assumed to depend on their respective marketable human capital (Fi) and local labor market characteristics (in) but are assumed to be independent of their current hours of work. The market labor demand or off-farm wage functions are summarized in vector form as:
The expectation is that increasing marketable human skills (e.g., formal schooling, vocational training, and experience) shifts upward the labor demand curve. Restrictive land rental and ownership opportunities are expected to reduce labor mobility in rural labor markets and to affect wage offers.
The farm business is assumed to produce and sell farm output (Q). Variable inputs in farm production are husband's and wife's farm labor (T1M 77) and purchased inputs (X), including labor hired from other households. Farm family and hired farm labor are assumed to be heterogeneous because of different entrepreneurial skills and incentives to work. The efficiency of farm production depends on human capital of the husband and wife (EM, EF) and on other farmspecific characteristics (4); e.g., climate. The technology of farm production is represented by the concave production function: Q = Q(T TM [F X; EM, EF, F) (4)
The production function (4) (Maddala, 1981) .2
IV. The Data and Empirical Results
The model of off-farm labor supply is to be fitted to data for a random sample of Iowa farm households collected in 1977.
The Data
The data for the analysis were obtained from a have early farming experience have lesser probabilities of off-farm work than ones raised elsewhere. His early farm background, however, has only a weak tendency to reduce his wife's probability of off-farm work.
Children and the growing season affect the productivity of home and farm time. The presence of young children (< age 6) reduces the probability of a husband and wife working off-farm. Caring for young children is, therefore, more compatible with farm than off-farm work. Children ages 6-11 also reduce the probability that a wife works offfarm, but there is no effect on husband's off-farm work probability. Older children (ages 12-18) do not affect either parent's probability of off-farm work, suggesting no net effect on the reservation wage. A longer crop-growing season, which raises the marginal product of farm work, lowers the probability that the husband, but not wife, works off-farm.
Larger asset income tends to reduce the probability of off-farm work of the husband and wife, 5Acres operated and farm capital in machinery and livestock are excluded from the set of regressors because they are also household decision variables.
suggesting that home time is a normal good. Farm household members that are more isolated from jobs have a lower probability of off-farm work.
Holding the off-farm wage constant, a longer commute to the nearest city reduces the net wage and has the expected negative and significant effect of reducing the probability that the husband and wife work off-farm. The negative effect of MCITY diminishes as distance increases.
Off-farm Labor-Demand Equations: Off-farm labor-demand equations for the husband and wife wives than for husbands. The results also imply that wives' wage-experience profiles are more concave than for husbands.7 These are unusual male-female differences (Smith and Ward, 1984) , but nonfarm females may spend a larger share of their worklife in wage work than farm males.
Local labor market conditions affect labor demand. In the western region, males earn 12.7% less and females earn 31.4% less than in the east.
Off-farm Labor-Supply Equations: The unconditional off-farm labor supply equations ((24)- (25)) with sample selection terms included were fitted to all 771 sample observations. The wage rates were predicted from equations (26) and (27), and the probability of a particular conditional structure and sample selection variables (Sijs) were derived from the bivariate probit estimates presented in table 2.
The off-farm labor supply equations were fitted by using Hoerl et al.'s (1975) version of the ridge estimator.8 The ridge estimator was pursued because of extreme near multicollinearity. This is caused by the weighting scheme (same pjs) for all variables appearing in each conditional supply equation and by appearance of many of the same variables in the two conditional supply equations composing each unconditional supply equation except for different probability weights. Hoerl et al.'s (1975) procedure was employed, and stability of the ridge estimator was checked. Estimates of the ridge-K were shown to change by less than 0.1% for each 0.01 increment to K.9 The t-ratios reported in table 3 are conditional on the predicted wage rates and sample selection terms.
Other methods of computing t-ratios would give good properties when near-multicollinearity is a problem (Vinod, 1978; Lin and Kmenta, 1982) , but Vinod (1978) concluded that hypothesis tests may be affected by the bias of the estimator. The stability of the estimator is quite useful for estimating marginal effects. Our experience may be useful to others. We encountered several problems when we implemented an econometric model adapted for two binding non-negativity constraints. When conditional off-farm supply equations were fitted by least squares to subsamples, some subsample sizes were small, and t-ratios for estimated coefficients were generally small. When an unconditional supply equation was adopted, it suffered from nearmulticollinearity. Finally, a maximum likelihood estimator for the system is expensive to obtain.
IThese are all problems that other researchers might expect to encounter when they attempt to econometrically model multiple binding non-negativity constraints.
11 An estimate of the unconditional population response of husband's off-farm labor supply to a one-unit change in 4j is .1 + P2ae,
